U3.02/01 TSO support to SNRC in the licensing of K2R4 units

Over the last years, nuclear power has provided between 40 and 45% of the overall electricity supply in Ukraine. Against the background of a difficult domestic fuel production (coal, gas) and a difficult financial situation to pay for fossil fuel imports, this contribution was critical, Nuclear power is actually produced in 4 nuclear power stations operated by Energoatom comprising 13 reactors: two are of the VVER 440/213 type (Rovno 1 and 2) and 11 are of the VVER 1000 type (six in Zaporizhya, one in Khmelnitsky, three in South Ukraine and the third unit of Rovno). All of these are of a type which can be upgraded to international safety levels. As is the case for fossil fuel plants, nuclear power plants also have fuel problems. Ukraine depends on nuclear fuel supplies from Russia and, due to lack of cash, has regularly experienced difficulties in securing timely supply.

Ukraine is party to the International "Convention on Nuclear Safety" which became into force on 24 October 1996.

Ukraine is party to the "Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management" which entered into force on 18 June 2001.

Ukraine acceded to the "Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage" with entry into force on 20 December 1996. The independent "State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine" (SNRCU), in charge of regulatory and inspection functions has been established by a presidential decree on 5 December 2000. The Ukrainian Technical Safety Organisation (TSO) is the State Scientific and Technical Centre (SSTC) and its staff amounts about 300 employees. Since 1996 the Ukrainian regulatory authorities have been supported by the EU TSO through different EBRD and TACIS projects related to evaluation of the Modernisation Programme proposed by the Utility. One of the main results of such assistance was the enhancement of the initially proposed Modernisation Programme by additional measures.

Beneficiary /location:SNRCU – State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraiine/ Kiev - Ukraine

Main contractor: RISKAUDIT IRSN/GRS International (GEIE)

Subcontractors:

• Institut de Radioprotection et de S Nuclre (IRSN), Gesellschaft fagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS),Association Vinte Nuclear (AVN)
• Nuclear Research Institute Rez (NRI)
• Local subcontractor: State Scientific Technical Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC)

The main objective of the licensing assistance program is to promote the implementation in Ukraine of a licensing process based on a technical dialogue between operator and regulator by providing technical support to the Ukrainian Safety Authority in its licensing activities related to Khmelnitsky and Rovno NPPs. The aim is to check whether the safety-upgrading programme will lead to a safety level acceptable from a Western safety point of view at the time of commissioning.

UK/TS/27 project should provide assistance to the Ukrainian regulator SNRCU and to its TSO (SSTC) in the licensing process regarding Khmelnitsky / Rovno NPP, especially in:

• Licensing of the improvements to be implemented in accordance with the Modernisation Programme,
• Commissioning tests and unit start-up;
• Assistance to SNRCU in licensing activities related to the Project Implementation Phase (PIP) U1.01/01A, Reconstruction of the primary circuit overpressure system for Rovno 1 and 2.

During the project the compliance of the actually implemented modernizations programmes with the 2000 modernisation programme for K2R4 has been evaluated. The performed expert review concluded that the safety level at the time of commissioning reaches international acceptable standards. All 147 measures, committed in 2000, are still planned for implementation. The proportion between the measures to be applied “before commissioning” and “after commissioning” has not been significantly changed. From the 147 measures identified in the K2R4 MP:

• 80 measures will be implemented before the commissioning and
• 64 measures will be completed after the commissioning.

In the above mentioned numbers 3 measures are not included; deviations from the former approaches are revealed (technical solution of the measures has been changed). However some deviations from the MP 2000 have been revealed on the proposed technical solutions of the measures related to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) surveillance and to the consideration of High-Energy pipes breaks. For some measures the implementation schedule was changed - 23 are brought forward from “after” to “before” commissioning and 19are postponed and would not be completed before the units start-up. The measures which have impact on the safety will be compensated by adequate preventive and/or compensatory measures which allow keeping the safety acceptable at K2R4 commissioning. Taking into consideration that the Ukrainian side meets the assumptions and recommendations related to RPV surveillance and high-energy pipes integrity, the safety level would remain equivalent to the one committed in the MP 2000 for both stages – at the time of the commissioning and at the time when all safety upgrading measures are implemented. The NAEK committed himself to finalize the implementation of all measures in the frame of the Loan Agreement at the latest a three years after commissioning.

Three inspection visits of Khmelnitski2/Rovno4 to evaluate the implementation status of the modernization measures at K2/R4, were conducted by SNRCU/SSTC with participation EU TSO experts. A detailed report describing current status of the modernisation program and the foreseen possibility to implement the whole program before the end of the third outage was prepared.
Another part of this project was aimed to assistance in an evaluation of several Safety Analysis report (SAR) chapters:

• Chapter of the SAR related to External Hazards,
• Chapter of the SAR related to the Internal Hazards,
• Chapter of the SAR related to the systems performance,
• Chapter of the SAR related to the Quality Assurance programme,
• Chapter of the SAR related to the General requirements to decommissioning,
• Chapter of the SAR related to the justification of the adequateness of the Pre-commissioning Programme.

Reviewed documents were analyzed with respect to the quality and the completeness of the presented information and compliance with the international good practice. For each chapter many of conclusions and recommendations have been done and they presented in detail in the Technical report of Task 2.

Assistance to SNRCU in evaluation of the “Programme for units commissioning” was given and following recommendations concerning the structure and content of the commissioning programme have been drawn:

• To check whether the commissioning programme has been set-up taking into account the experience feedback of the start-up of other nuclear units (eg.Temelin, ZNPP, Rostov...)
• To check in detail some selected test procedures.

For these selected test procedures, it is recommended that if test conditions (pressure, temperature…) are different compared with the accident conditions, taken into account in the safety demonstration, the criteria to respect in testing conditions have been calculated to ensure that if these criteria are met in testing conditions the equipment tested would meet the safety criteria in SAR accident conditions

• To take advantage of the start-up tests to validate normal operating procedures and related equipment. This verification should be included in every test procedure.
• To check that the K2 NPP test procedures cover all the current safety studies to take into account in the SAR.
• To add in to programme the strategy and procedure to be followed in case of deviation

In additional support in evaluation of the conformity of ‘’old’’ equipment (installed since long period of time) was provided and comments on the application of the super pipe concept on the Khmelnitsky 2 NPP were given.

Assistance to SNRCU in licensing the reconstruction of the primary over pressure protection system of Rovno NPP was given by means reviewing of the specification for implementation of the equipment and decision for mounting and by reviewing of the documentation of the NPP relative to the thermal hydraulic calculations and the modification of the procedures for the implementation of the feed and bleed cooling mode of operation.