R4.01/94: Saftey Analysis and En

The storage facility (pool storage) located at Krasnoyarsk is the single facility for storing VVER-1000 spent fuel. Its capacity was at that time utilized around 50 %. Some safety aspects were already addressed; the aim of the project was to assist the Russian Federation in performing a state-of-the-art analysis and environmental impact study, using EC methodology. Probabilistic methods had to be used where necessary.

The objective in particular was:

Performing a safety assessment of the current situation, including aspects related to the environmental impact;
Providing recommendations for the implementation of modifications or improvements;
Safety Analysis and Environmental Report (SAEIR).
The main activity on this project is the review of safety issues related to the storage in pool of spent nuclear fuel at Krasnoyarsk. It will be based on the notion of good engineering judgment.

The issues that were deemed critical for safety were considered more in detail with the possible use (if deemed necessary on a case-by-case basis) of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) method. The conclusions of the safety review were considered necessary to establish a list of all the shortcomings of safety requirements as well as a recommendation of modifications, improvements or additional studies to be performed.

As a main conclusion, the Krasnoyarsk radwaste facility is reported as globally capable to cope with the storage of spent fuel until now.

However, improvements and complementary studies are identified to be needed to upgrade the current safety level, and eventually ensure the safe operation of the facility in the next years. Lack of storage facility operation feedback was reported as the source of the identified issues. Operation feedback actually enabled to validate and confirm the design arrangements. Some time is needed to the Beneficiary to review and evaluate the results and underlying methods.

Some results had been acknowledged as really new for the Russian environment (e.g. the ALARA-principle, PSA application, seismic verification of pipes and equipment).

The specific project objective has been achieved.
Safety Analysis has been completed together with the identification of shortcomings and the recommendations for modifications and improvements. However, only at the end of the contract such outcomes have been made available to the project partner, also because the safety evaluations for the mentioned reasons were squeezed within the final period of the contract.