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Nuclear Safety Cooperation

R1.07/00 A (R1.07/97 E)

  • Closed
TACIS Region
Benefitting Zone
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
€ 4,497,000.00
EU Contribution
Contracted in 2002
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States


Type of activity

Equipment Supply



Contracting authority

Concern Rosenergoatom

Method of Procurement

(FR2007) Negotiated Procedure - External Actions


16/12/2003 - 16/06/2007





Project / Budget year

ZZ0003 Nuclear Safety 2000 / 2000


In the frame of the TACIS 1997 programme the EC agreed with Rosenergoatom to include a project for the modernisation of the Reactor Control and Protection System (RCPS) of Novovoronezh Unit 5. Novovoronezh Unit 5 is a VVER-1000, model 187 reactor and was the first VVER-1000 to be constructed in the world.

The so-called Project Preparation Phase of the project, with the objective of preparing all technical documentation ready for a launch of the Call for Tender, was performed in the frame of the TACIS On-Site Assistance to Novovoronezh, R1.07/97. The project for modernisation of the Reactor Control and Protection System was nominated as project R1.07/97E. When all preparations were completed, the equipment procurement phase of the project (the so-called project Implementation Phase) was programmed under the TACIS 2000 programme as project R1.07/00A.


The existing RCPS system had the following disadvantages and departures from the requirements of the existing regulatory documents:

  • availability of only one Emergency Protection (EP) set;
  • physically obsolete Control and Protection System (CPS) electrical equipment;
  • location of two sets of the Neutron Flux Monitoring Equipment (NFME) in one room.

The purpose of the RCPS modernisation was to increase the reliability level and safety level of NvNPP Unit 5, bringing the RCPS equipment in line with the existing regulatory documents.

In accordance with the requirements of the current standards and regulations the emergency protection system is required to:

  • Comprise at least two independent sets (p. of PNAE G-1-024 - 90);
  • Comprise hardware to ensure acquisition, processing, recording and storage of data that is sufficient to assure, in good time and in an unambiguous way, detection of initiating events of abnormal operation and accidents and their progression. The above mentioned hardware should make it possible to identify actual conditions of operation for safety systems and components, important to safety, belonging to safety class 1 and safety class 2, including monitoring and control systems, to identify departures from design-basis conditions, and assess staff actions. (p. of PNAE G -01-011-97).
  • Decrease the possibility of false actuation to the minimum achievable (4.4..5.5 – PNAEG-01-011-97);
  • Comply with the following safety principles:
  • redundancy;
  • independence;
  • diversity.

Redundancy, independence and diversity had to be of a grade assuring that single failures of control safety system do not impair the RCPS operability, and that protection from common cause failure is assured as well (p. of PNAE G -01-011-97).

The implementation of the scoped measures would:

  • eliminate the inadequacy regarding the current safety standards and regulations;
  • decrease the safety deficiency of Unit-5 by the implementation of two identical independent emergency protection sets;
  • replace the existing RCPS electrical hardware with one of a higher safety level;
  • implement the Emergency Protection system with better reactor process parameters protection equipment;
  • implement the reactor control and protection system with better hardware for RCPS electrical hardware monitoring and diagnosis;
  • considerably reduce the occurrence probability of initiating events of reactor plant normal operation disturbance;
  • enhance the electromagnetic interference protection level of the RCPS electrical hardware;
  • enhance performance reliability of the electrical hardware for reactor plant control and protection;
  • widen the scope of planned inspections, including during operation, for the functional adequacy of high level of defence;
  • separate physically the two neutron flux monitoring equipment sets.

The objective of the project was a step-by-step modernization of the existing reactor control and protection system in order to bring this equipment in conformance with current norms and standards. The implementation at Novovoronezh NPP site would be realised according to the following main:

  • Erection of a second set of reactor protection channels (set 2);
  • Putting the second set of protection into operation in ‘monitoring’ mode
  • Reconstruction of the existing set of reactor protection channels (set 1);
  • Commissioning and commercial operation of the 2 redundant sets.

The scope of the equipment supplies included:

  • 2 sets of instrumentation for process parameters
  • 2 sets of equipment for Reactor Control, Limitation and Protection functions
  • Uninterruptible power supplies for the above equipment
  • Uninterruptible power supply for the control rods drives
  • Cables
  • Panels for monitoring in the Main Control Room.

The scope of supply of the supplier in more detail was:

  • Design;
  • Manufacture;
  • Testing;
  • Adaptation to Russian language;
  • Certification;
  • Delivery;
  • Technical supervision of acceptance;
  • Technical supervision of installation;
  • Commissioning and functional tests;
  • Training and know-how transfer;
  • Provision of after-sales service by the supplier for the new reactor control and protection system.


The Call for Tender was launched on 21 June 2003.

A site clarification meeting with potential tenderers was held at Novovoronezh NPP on 28 & 29 July 2003.
The tender evaluation was held at Gundremmingen NPP, Germany, between 15 and 25 September 2003.Three tenders were received. The winning bid was submitted by Data Systems & Solutions SAS, France. The resulting contract was signed 15 December 2003.

The project ran for a period of just over 18 months during which time several serious disputes arose between the contracting parties. The EC took all possible steps to ensure the necessary conditions were in place to allow the contract to proceed. In a meeting between the parties on 26 July 2005, the Contractor decided to terminate the contract. The EC recovered the advanced payment that had been made to the Contractor.

The Beneficiary/End User took steps to replace the RCPS under the Russian nuclear operator’s own financing.