According to reports (dated 23.03.1992) of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 156 fires broke out during the period 1980-1988. During this period, the number of nuclear power plant blocks grew from 23 to 46.
Of altogether 156 reported fires, 25 occurred in the nuclear power plant Chernobyl which consequently holds the largest per cent share. In 1991, the fire incident in reactor block 2 took place resulting in the shut-down of that block which was not put back into operation.
The nuclear power plants of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Chernobyl, had the emphasis on active fire protection systems. The structural passive fire protection had not been given the necessary priority.
The contract assigned by the EC Commission takes account of the fact that:
- In the nuclear power plants of the CIS, the probability of an outbreak of fires, including all the possible consequential damages, is very high.
- The Chernobyl nuclear power plant blocks 1 and 3 will be reconnected.
- The passive fire protection in nuclear power plants of the CIS must be given increased attention.
- Western European assistance must aim at the instruction of nuclear power plant specialists of the CIS, which can subsequently themselves and independently process fire protection materials according to Western standard.
- The conditions of passive fire protection in other nuclear power plants of the CIS are similar to the situation in Chernobyl and therefore, the Chernobyl project has model character. This regards the instruction, the training and demonstration as well as the elaboration of a manual for passive fire protection including a standard training programme.
1. The realization of the contract could be concluded within the stipulated time frame.
2. The training objectives were achieved. The subdivision of the training into two phases has proved effective.
The instruction and training in a West European company mediated, next to the expert know-how, the essential questions of an efficient:
- Production preparation.
- Assembly organization.
- Work place preparation.
- Working culture.
- High quality standards.
Training in a Western company provides the possibility to school instructors for the second training phase.
4. Phase II of the training in Chernobyl could be successfully concluded also in particular thanks to the support and assistance of the nuclear power plant personnel. The motivation for achievement of the training objective was clearly there.
After completion of the works the trainees received corresponding achievements certificates by the instructing Western company.
5. After conclusion of the second phase it can be assessed that the instructed engineers, specialists/expert workmen and mechanics are now competent to:
- Install, repair and maintain passive fire protection systems of West European make in accordance with the required quality standards.
- Independently repair fire damages according to the mediated methods, being aware that time delays lead to substantial secondary damages.
1. Based on the results of phases I and II a standard training programme was elaborated.
The programme determines, in conclusion of this first instruction cycle, the optimum training duration and suggests a training schedule as well as the required qualification of the trainees and instructors.
It follows that the optimum training period is 2 weeks, including arrival and departure day.
This training programme is applicable to all nuclear power plant types in the CIS.
2. The optimal number of trainees to participate in the first phase of the training programme in Western Europe is 5 persons that are 3 specialists for passive fire protection and 2 specialists for fire damage restoration.
3. The Western company to effect the training should dispose of a number of specialized staff who have such thorough command of the Russian language in spoken and written that interpretation services are only required to a limited extent.
Training via interpreters, especially as regards the execution of demonstration works, is not effective.
4.In evaluation of the second phase of the training in the nuclear power plant, it can be determined that two Western instructors are sufficient for adequate realization of the training in the nuclear power plant, on condition that a prior training of nuclear power plant specialists was effected in Western Europe.
5. The amount of demonstration material, in particular the machinery, is to be specified.
It is suggested to employ at least two spraying devices in future training programmes.
6. It has proved efficient to provide the trainees with instructions in Russian language of the essential assembly guidelines and the processing parameters. These manuals must be subject to regular update.
7. It is estimated important to instruct engineer-technical personnel of the nuclear power plant in a West European company, in particular with regard to the question of quality control/supervision, in order to enforce the attainment of a higher security standard.
8. In the course of the instruction in Western Europe, training in a nuclear power plant is strongly recommended.
The quality and security standards of passive fire protection can this way be demonstrated and trained in a vivid as well as efficient manner.
9. The passive fire protection systems to be supplied to the nuclear power plant for training and demonstration must be approved by the relevant West European licensing authorities. A corresponding licence by the relevant authorities of the CIS (Ministry of the Interior) must in any case also be at hand.
A demonstration of the systems without proof of the relevant test results and licences is not admissible in the CIS.