UKRAINE ACTION PLAN - MISSION ZAPOROZHE

Pursuant to the decision of the European Council in Corfu on 24/25 June, 1994, and to those of the G7 summit in Naples on 8/9 July, 1994, concerning an action plan for Ukraine aiming at the early and definitive shutdown of the Chernobyl NPP, the European Commission had decided to continue to assume a leading role in the implementation of the action plan.

In order to compensate for a loss of electricity power generation due to Chernobyl NPP shutdown, Ukraine had only two alternatives to natural gas and oil import from Russia and the Middle East: extensive use of national coal and/or increased use of nuclear power. Ukrainian coal is of low quality and includes a lot of ash, and thus, is not suitable for massive electricity production as it is very polluting.

Concerning nuclear power, Ukraine made the decision in the early 90’s to continue operation of Chernobyl NPP units 1 and 3, to restart unit 2 and to complete several reactors of VVER 1000/320 type.

Operation of insufficiently safe reactors in the CIS was giving rise to major international concerns. In particular, the EU wanted to see Chernobyl NPP closed down as soon as possible.
The EU and the G7 were examining the possibility to contribute to the completion of 3 VVER NPP units under construction in Ukraine, Zaporozhe-6, Rovno-4 and Khmelnitsky-2. In return, Ukraine would agree to a definitive shutdown of the 3 operating units at Chernobyl NPP. A political agreement with Ukraine was therefore under consideration. In order to proceed, it was necessary to have a clear understanding of the work required to complete the 3 VVER units and the associated cost and schedule. Consequently, the EC financed a number of projects to establish realistic work schedules and cost estimates for the completion of the 3 NPPs.

The EC first financed a series of fact finding missions to Ukraine to engage with the Ukrainian authorities, gather information on the construction status of the 3 NPPs and establish cost estimates for their completion (see contracts 22664, 22635, 22636 and 22653).

Following the fact-finding missions, the EC placed a follow-up contract for the elaboration of project implementation schemes for the completion and safety upgrading of the 3 NPP units (contract 22739) and a complementary contract for a further mission to Zaporozhe NPP (contract 23033). The combined results of the two contracts are given below.

Main aim of the Project was the development of project implementation schemes for the completion and safety upgrading of the three Ukrainian NPPs:

• Rovno NPP Unit 4,
• Khmelnitsky NPP unit 2,
• Zaporozhe NPP Unit 6.

The project implementation schemes were to cover a period of three years and outline:

• the different technical and organisational steps that need to be foreseen to implement the completion of the three VVER-1000 reactors to internationally acceptable safety standards;
• the related financial requirements at the different implementation steps, thus allowing for an adequate financial planning ahead;
• potential organisational structures necessary and able to implement the action plan, including scope for participation of Russian and, in particular, Ukrainian nuclear industry.

The results of the study completed just prior to the present project (the Fact-Finding Mission to Ukraine [June 1994] – see contracts 22664, 22635, 22636 and 22653) were to be used as a basis.

Methodology

In order to reach harmonized work results, the Consultant (Consortium Lahmeyer International – Belgatom – LI-BA) started the joint effort in preparing preliminary project implementation schemes, consisting of preliminary time schedules and preliminary disbursement schedules for the completion and safety upgrading of the 3 NPP units.

Questionnaires were sent to the three NPP Operators and to GOSKOMATOM in preparation for planned visits to the Ukrainian counterparts.

The basis for the establishment of preliminary time schedules and cash flow diagrams were:

• the data given by the NPP Operators during the previous Fact Finding Missions
• the Consultants' own judgement on the inclusion of additional measures which were required for reaching the pre-agreed internationally acceptable safety level.
• The preliminary project implementation schemes and the proposed organisational structures were then jointly discussed with representatives of all three NPPs, of GOSKOMATOM and AtomEnergoProekt (AEP) Kiev, during the second week of October 1994. The results of these discussions were evaluated and implemented in the preliminary schemes.

Proposed Organisational Structures

Potential structures were proposed by the Consultant and discussed with representatives of GOSKOMATOM, AEP Kiev, and the NPPs in question. A basic common understanding between the Consultant and the Ukrainian counterparts as well as between the Ukrainian counterparts themselves was found, during the Consultant's short visit in the second week of October 1994.

The recommended organisational structure was based on the feature that all responsibility for the erection, upgrading to an international acceptable safety level, commissioning and operation of the three units would remain on the Ukrainian side. The European Commission (EC) would provide financial and technical support for completion and increase in nuclear safety of the units.

The proposed structure comprised mainly the European Union represented by the European Commission, the Ukrainian Government with the subordinate institutions GOSKOMATOM, the NPP Operators/Utilities and the architect-engineer AEP Kiev and AEP Kharkov, independent Western consultants as well as further institutions, e. g. the licensing authority and suppliers.

The link between the sponsor or donor side and the NPP is made by a functional unit consisting of:

• a technical part, the STEERING COMMITTEE;
• a financial part, the FUNDING INSTITUTION.

Concerning the project management structure of each site, adequate strong and efficient organisational project structures were proposed. For each site there must be one project leader (PL) assigned to the "Completion and Safety Upgrading of the NPP unit" who has to be fully responsible for the successful implementation and execution of the project at site. He should be supported by a Project Management Group (PMG).

Financial Planning and Control

A financial flow diagram with the identification of the most important actors on the financial scene has been proposed.

It was recommended that the TACIS Grant, as it is available on very short notice, should be attributed to immediate actions for services and engineering as well as for the very urgent needs of the NPP's.

A Euratom loan should be considered mainly for the procurement of equipment.

Project Implementation Schemes for Rovno, Unit 4

According to the time schedule elaborated by the Consultant in close cooperation with the NPP personnel, the duration of the completion phase of NPP Rovno, unit 4, would be about 44 months.

The critical path was mainly determined by the replacement of the process computer system of the main control room and the following commissioning of the unit. The significance of the process computer system in view of reaching an international acceptable safety level and the included scope of design and engineering work had still to be recognized by all involved parties.

The cost calculation performed within the Fact Finding Mission had to be modified. The revised figure of the total estimated budget for the completion and an upgrading to an acceptable safety level of Rovno, unit 4, was 376 MUSD.

The reasons for the reduction were, e. g., the increasing understanding by the NPP Operator of the intended safety improvement measures, and further the identification of measures (double counting) already covered by assistance programmes of other parties.

Project Implementation Schemes for Khmelnitsky, Unit 2

The budget estimations performed for Khmelnitsky, unit 2, during the previous contract (fact finding missions - June 1994) for the pre-agreed safety level were reconfirmed at 365 MUSD.

The detailed time schedule for the completion of unit 2 of Khmelnitsky had several critical paths identified.

Project Implementation Schemes for Zaporozhe Unit 6

The Zaporozhe Unit 6 was visited by the Consultant for the first time; it was estimated that full power operation could be reached in 14 months if the first funds were made available at the end of 1994. It was stressed that besides the costs for completion, about the same amount of money would be necessary for the completion of the common site facilities.

General Conclusions

Actions to be performed within the ensuing three months and, in particular, immediate actions necessary for a better and final definition of the sets of measures corresponding to an "international acceptable safety level" for each NPP involved were described in the final report of the contract.

Further, a proposal for a short term action plan was outlined.