- Status
- Closed
Background
This project is the extension of R7.04/96 needed after the updating of the Rosenergoatom initial data.
The construction of Kalinin NPP Unit 3 (VVER 1000 model V-320) started in 1985.
As in 1996 was 60% complete, the project consisting in its completion and upgrading, presented an opportunity to retrofit the existing design to meet internationally accepted safety basis applied to western plants of the same generation.
Rosenergoatom applied to get a Euroatom loan to finance the completion and modernisation of Kalinin NPP Unit 3.
The project costs for the achievement of the completion and modernisation of Kalinin NPP Unit 3 were presented by Rosenergoatom to the European Commission to calculate the participation of the Euratom loan in the funding of the project.
Objectives
The objective was to assess the reasonableness of the costs of the project for the completion and modernisation of Kalinin NPP Unit 3, evaluating to which extend the budgetary proposal for equipments, services and contracts was coherent with the world market prices.
These costs included:
1) Completion construction costs including cooling towers.
2) Modernisation construction costs.
3) Repair and replacement construction costs.
4) Engineering, project management, pre-operation and commissioning costs.
5) First fuel load cost. (Not equipment or service but consumable)
6) Debts from existing contracts.
7) Taxes and customs duties.
The project Contractor (Electricité de France) performed the full costs evaluation with the following exclusions:
- Certification of new equipment.
- Guarantee.
- Accidental damage.
- Pre-works for insurance.
- Price contingencies.
- Interest during construction.
- Bank fees.
Results
1) Completion costs:
The estimated cost for the completion of Kalinin NPP Unit 3 was performed by Rosenergoatom in detail.
On the basis of the data provided by Rosenergoatom, it was concluded from the analysis and counter evaluation that though some disparities at the unit price level existed, no major anomalies were detected through the analysis.
2) Modernisation cost:
The overall analysis of the content of the modernisation programme showed its consistency with other programmes implemented or scheduled elsewhere in similar plants.
Even if some discrepancies about the costing of some modernisation measures remained, both estimations were globally consistent.
3) Repair and replacement cost:
The range of the given amount is acceptable.
4) Engineering, project management and pre-operation costs:
The ratio “engineering cost for completion” is acceptable for units where the original design is nearly complete.
The ratio “engineering cost for modernisation” is consistent with a similar ratio for Western plants.
The ratio “project management cost” could be higher if a stronger western support is taken into account.
5) First fuel load cost:
The price provided by Rosenergoatom was consistent from a western point of view, but savings were possible in that area.
6) Debts from existing contracts:
EDF were not in a position to perform any checking of this amount, consequently the figure given by Rosenergoatom was taken as an input data.
7) Taxes and custom duties:
An exemption could be obtained from Russian Authorities for custom duties.